Rationalizability, Observability, and Common Knowledge

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB047zbMath1484.91066OpenAlexW3203771163MaRDI QIDQ5064554

Antonio Penta, Peio Zuazo-Garin

Publication date: 16 March 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab047

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessrationalizabilityfirst-mover advantagehigher-order beliefseductive co-ordinationextensive-form uncertaintykreps hypothesisStackelberg selections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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The value of a coordination game ⋮ Feigning ignorance for long-term gains ⋮ Information design in multistage games

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