Profit sharing with thresholds and non-monotone player utilities

DOI10.1007/s00224-015-9667-8zbMath1356.91005OpenAlexW98573061MaRDI QIDQ506517

John Postl, Elliot Anshelevich

Publication date: 1 February 2017

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-015-9667-8

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchyprice of stabilitystrong equilibriumnon-monotone utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Strong equilibrium in congestion games
• Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities
• Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
• Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
• Mechanisms for (mis)allocating scientific credit
• Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

This page was built for publication: Profit sharing with thresholds and non-monotone player utilities