On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources

DOI10.1007/s00224-016-9701-5zbMath1356.91063OpenAlexW996368221WikidataQ59473987 ScholiaQ59473987MaRDI QIDQ506522

Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang, George Christodoulou

Publication date: 1 February 2017

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-016-9701-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints ⋮ Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ Asymptotic efficiency of the proportional compensation scheme for a large number of producers ⋮ The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users

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