The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
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Publication:506806
DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2015.07.026zbMath1354.91110OpenAlexW1168278373MaRDI QIDQ506806
Marta Biancardi, Giovanni Villani
Publication date: 2 February 2017
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.026
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
- An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
- International Environmental Agreement: A Dynamical Model of Emissions Reduction
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING
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