The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2015.07.026zbMath1354.91110OpenAlexW1168278373MaRDI QIDQ506806

Marta Biancardi, Giovanni Villani

Publication date: 2 February 2017

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.026

zbMATH Keywords

R\&Dasymmetriesinternational environmental agreementscoalition stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (1)

Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries

Cites Work

• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• International Environmental Agreement: A Dynamical Model of Emissions Reduction
• COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING

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