The Stackelberg Games of Water Extraction with Myopic Agents

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500237zbMath1489.91060OpenAlexW4200075717MaRDI QIDQ5072232

Víctor Bucarey López, Alain Jean-Marie, Mabel Maria Tidball

Publication date: 26 April 2022

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500237

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameStackelberg gamewater resource management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Discrete-time games (91A50) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Existence theories for optimal control problems involving partial differential equations (49J20)

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