Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic

DOI10.1080/11663081.2022.2041351OpenAlexW4214641818MaRDI QIDQ5074371

Mircea Dumitru, Adrian Miroiu

Publication date: 9 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2022.2041351

zbMATH Keywords

three-valued logicconsensusunanimityabsolute majoritysimple majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Uses Software

• Arrow Gibbard Satterthwaite

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation
• Reasoning about social choice functions
• Logical constraints on judgement aggregation
• Introduction to judgment aggregation
• Post's functional completeness theorem
• Many-valued judgment aggregation: characterizing the possibility/impossibility boundary
• Aggregation of non-binary evaluations
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
• A criterion of fullness of many-valued systems of propositional logic
• The limits of epistemic democracy
• Social choice theory in HOL. Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite
• Judgement aggregation in non-classical logics
• Logics for Modelling Collective Attitudes
• Formal Structure of Majority Decision
• Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Handbook of philosophical logic. Vol. 2.

This page was built for publication: Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic