Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.46OpenAlexW2977566637MaRDI QIDQ5075789

Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre, Diodato Ferraioli

Publication date: 11 May 2022

Full work available at URL: https://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/esa/esa2019.html#FerraioliMPV19

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalityapproximate mechanism designextensive-form mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx)

Related Items (1)

Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation

Cites Work

• Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
• Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation. The case of machine scheduling
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems
• Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
• The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions

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