On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
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Publication:5076342
DOI10.1613/jair.1.13449OpenAlexW3129141234MaRDI QIDQ5076342
Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer, Felix Brandt
Publication date: 16 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.00499
Related Items (3)
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
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