Interactive Information Design
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Publication:5076695
DOI10.1287/moor.2020.1119zbMath1491.91031OpenAlexW3166187620MaRDI QIDQ5076695
Tristan Tomala, Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau
Publication date: 17 May 2022
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01791918/file/wp_201822_.pdf
Bayesian persuasionstatistical experimentsinformation designBayes correlated equilibriumsplitting games
Related Items (3)
Long information design ⋮ Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games ⋮ Private communication in competing mechanism games
Cites Work
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