Equilibria Existence in Bayesian Games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy

DOI10.1287/moor.2021.1135zbMath1491.91030OpenAlexW3042995263MaRDI QIDQ5076704

Ziv Hellman, Yehuda John Levy

Publication date: 17 May 2022

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/232668/2/232668.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Borel equivalence relationsequilibrium existenceBayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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