On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:508382
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.005zbMath1400.91374OpenAlexW2191631169MaRDI QIDQ508382
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/27590/070econDP15-10.pdf
stabilityuniquenessefficiencystrategy-proofnessmatching with contractsirrelevance of rejected contracts
Related Items
Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts, Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement, Strategy-proof allocation with outside option, Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms, Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability, Graduate admission with financial support, Characterizations of the cumulative offer process, Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts, Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
Cites Work
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- School Choice with Consent*
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
