Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games
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Publication:508394
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.004zbMath1400.91111OpenAlexW2182464862MaRDI QIDQ508394
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://summit.sfu.ca/item/18388
Related Items (2)
Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
Cites Work
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