Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.002zbMath1400.91147OpenAlexW3124096769MaRDI QIDQ508408

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent preferencesstrategic distinguishabilityhierarchy of preferenceshigher order preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items

Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty ⋮ Universal interactive preferences

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