Stability with one-sided incomplete information
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Publication:508409
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.004zbMath1400.91367OpenAlexW2572854778MaRDI QIDQ508409
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/44w255g8
Related Items (7)
Decision-making with reference information ⋮ On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Tailored recommendations on a matching platform ⋮ School choice with costly information acquisition ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information
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