A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem
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Publication:5084102
DOI10.1137/21M1437214zbMath1493.91092arXiv2010.03820MaRDI QIDQ5084102
Publication date: 23 June 2022
Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.03820
Cites Work
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