Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.012zbMath1400.91379OpenAlexW2568900285MaRDI QIDQ508413

Marcin Pęski

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.012

zbMATH Keywords

matchingrandom utilitylarge market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

The roommate problem with externalities

Cites Work

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• The assignment game. I: The core
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems
• Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage