Who Chooses Commitment? Evidence and Welfare Implications

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB056zbMath1497.91157OpenAlexW4213124244MaRDI QIDQ5090025

Mark-Oliver Stehr, Justin R. Sydnor, Heather Royer, Dmitry Taubinsky, Mariana Carrera

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w26161.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

time inconsistencywelfarequasi-hyperbolic discountingbehaviour changecommitment contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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