Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990–99

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB052zbMath1497.91176OpenAlexW3195660651MaRDI QIDQ5090037

Mitsuru Igami, Takuo Sugaya

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab052

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustrepeated gamemergercollusioncartelcoordinated effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments ⋮ Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition

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