Winning by Default: Why is There So Little Competition in Government Procurement?

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB051zbMath1497.91159OpenAlexW2740683722MaRDI QIDQ5090038

Robert A. Miller, Karam Kang

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab051

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelauctionnegotiationstructural estimationprocurementendogenous competitioncontract menusemi-parametric identification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity

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