Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
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Publication:5090067
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB079zbMath1497.91034OpenAlexW3215004347MaRDI QIDQ5090067
Publication date: 15 July 2022
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab079
Related Items (8)
What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Self-evident events and the value of linking ⋮ The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ When (not) to publicize inspection results ⋮ Bad apples in symmetric repeated games ⋮ Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
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