Game efficiency through linear programming duality

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.66OpenAlexW2964196815MaRDI QIDQ5090446

Thang Nguyen Kim

Publication date: 18 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.06499

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchyprimal-dual

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

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