Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2019.21OpenAlexW2964055542MaRDI QIDQ5090469

Attila Juhos, Ágnes Cseh

Publication date: 18 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.00392

zbMATH Keywords

posetstable marriageacyclic preferencesintransitivityweakly stable matchingstrongly stable matchingsuper stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Related Items (1)

Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences

Cites Work

• College admissions with stable score-limits
• Stable marriage with general preferences
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• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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• Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
• Strongly stable matchings in time O ( nm ) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Ties
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• Characterisation of Strongly Stable Matchings
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• A Theory of Divided Government
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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