Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom?

DOI10.1387/THEORIA.22795zbMath1505.62454OpenAlexW4284881692MaRDI QIDQ5093531

Markus Dressel

Publication date: 28 July 2022

Published in: THEORIA (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.22795

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesianismwishful thinkingprescriptionvalue-free idealinductive riskscientist qua scientist

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Related Items (1)

Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom?

Cites Work

• The is-ought problem. An investigation in philosophical logic
• The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy
• Inductive risk: does it really refute value-freedom?

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