Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations

DOI10.1613/jair.1.12911OpenAlexW4280653062MaRDI QIDQ5094007

Yun Kuen Cheung, Kurt Mehlhorn, Bhaskar Chaudhury, Naveen Garg, Martin Hoefer, Jugal Garg

Publication date: 2 August 2022

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.12911

zbMATH Keywords

computational social systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Certifying algorithms
• Eisenberg-Gale markets: algorithms and game-theoretic properties
• APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items
• Improved algorithms for computing fisher's market clearing prices
• Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel Method
• Market equilibrium via a primal--dual algorithm for a convex program
• Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
• Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems
• Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
• Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
• On fair division for indivisible items
• Improving Nash Social Welfare Approximations
• Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
• Strongly polynomial algorithm for a class of minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives
• Approximating Nash social welfare under rado valuations