A Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium in a Pollution Reduction Scheme
DOI10.1142/S0219198921500146zbMath1497.91180OpenAlexW3169333136MaRDI QIDQ5094545
Publication date: 3 August 2022
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500146
stochastic gameenvironmental regulationStackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibriumambient chargehybrid pollution abatement technology
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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