A Manipulation Game Based on Machiavellian Strategies

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500158zbMath1497.91009OpenAlexW3185349928MaRDI QIDQ5094546

Julio B. Clempner

Publication date: 3 August 2022

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500158

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryincomplete informationmoral hazardmanipulationpersuasionMachiavellianism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Nonlinear programming (90C30) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• A Model of Expertise
• Setting Cournot Versus Lyapunov Games Stability Conditions and Equilibrium Point Properties
• On Lyapunov Game Theory Equilibrium: Static and Dynamic Approaches
• The War of Information
• Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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