Involuntary Unemployment as a Nash Equilibrium and Fiscal Policy for Full Employment

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500183zbMath1497.91155OpenAlexW3197172409MaRDI QIDQ5094547

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date: 3 August 2022

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500183

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generations modelfiscal policyinvoluntary unemploymentgame theoretic analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• A welfare economics foundation for the full-employment policy
• The dynamically extended Keynesian cross and the welfare-improving fiscal policy
• Keynesian Economics and Price Theory
• The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

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