Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
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Publication:5095181
DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2199zbMath1496.90074arXiv1809.08506OpenAlexW4207048065MaRDI QIDQ5095181
Publication date: 5 August 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.08506
rotationsdistributive latticestable matchingsschool choice problemEADAM algorithmLatin marriageslegal assignments
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