Hiring Secretaries over Time: The Benefit of Concurrent Employment
DOI10.1287/moor.2019.0993zbMath1444.60032arXiv1604.08125OpenAlexW2970334180WikidataQ127280538 ScholiaQ127280538MaRDI QIDQ5108268
Daniel Schmand, Martin Gairing, Andreas Tönnis, John Fearnley, Max Klimm, Yann Disser, Oliver Göbel, Alexander Skopalik
Publication date: 30 April 2020
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.08125
Markov processesMarkov chainonline algorithmsecretary problemprophet inequalitystopping problemcomputers/computer science, analysis of algorithms
Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Optimal stopping in statistics (62L15) Online algorithms; streaming algorithms (68W27)
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Cites Work
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