Salience, Myopia, and Complex Dynamic Incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5110005
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ023zbMath1437.91390OpenAlexW3023080731MaRDI QIDQ5110005
Robert J. Town, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Christina M. Dalton
Publication date: 14 May 2020
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz023
Related Items (2)
Time-consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursive payoffs and behavioral discounting ⋮ INSURANCE‐INDUCED MORAL HAZARD: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF WITHIN‐YEAR MEDICAL CARE DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
This page was built for publication: Salience, Myopia, and Complex Dynamic Incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D
