Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ019zbMath1437.91170OpenAlexW2187484857WikidataQ127706508 ScholiaQ127706508MaRDI QIDQ5110012

Stephan Lauermann, Mehmet Ekmekci

Publication date: 14 May 2020

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz019

zbMATH Keywords

votingpolitical economyinformation aggregationelection design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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