Price and Treatment Decisions in Epidemics — Stackelberg and Bargaining Games: The Role of Cost Functions

DOI10.1142/S0219198919500075zbMath1444.91075OpenAlexW2944793202WikidataQ127901581 ScholiaQ127901581MaRDI QIDQ5110632

Andrea Di Liddo

Publication date: 21 May 2020

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919500075

zbMATH Keywords

blow-upcost functionsNash bargainingStackelberg equilibriaexpensive treatmentshealth markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Medical epidemiology (92C60)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Effects of mosquitoes host choice on optimal intervention strategies for malaria control
• Optimal control of a vector borne disease with horizontal transmission
• Analyzing transmission dynamics of cholera with public health interventions
• Optimal control and stability analysis of an epidemic model with population dispersal
• Optimal control and treatment of infectious diseases. The case of huge treatment costs
• Modeling optimal intervention strategies for cholera
• Mathematical epidemiology.
• Optimal tax/subsidy combinations for the flu season
• Optimal control strategy for prevention of avian influenza pandemic
• Vaccination models and optimal control strategies to dengue
• Mathematical Structures of Epidemic Systems
• An Introduction to Mathematical Epidemiology

This page was built for publication: Price and Treatment Decisions in Epidemics — Stackelberg and Bargaining Games: The Role of Cost Functions