Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games

DOI10.1142/S0219198919500142zbMath1444.91033OpenAlexW2976369892WikidataQ127219627 ScholiaQ127219627MaRDI QIDQ5110640

Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju

Publication date: 21 May 2020

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919500142

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsasymmetric evolutionary gamesgames with continuous strategy spaceglobally strong uninvadable setsweak attracting sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear differential equations in abstract spaces (34G20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games

Cites Work

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