Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_2zbMath1443.91185OpenAlexW2947017015MaRDI QIDQ5111101

Thomas Marschak, Dong Wei

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_2

zbMATH Keywords

firmtechnology improvementdecentralized/centralized arrangement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models
• Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games
• Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• A First Course in Optimization Theory
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability

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