Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_7zbMath1443.91132OpenAlexW2947561579MaRDI QIDQ5111104

Leonid Hurwicz, Andrew Postlewaite, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_7

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsocial choice rulesoutcome functionstrategy domain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (4)

Distributions of the budget sets: an axiomatic analysis ⋮ Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Implementation via rights structures

Cites Work

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• A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments

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