Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_13zbMath1443.91129OpenAlexW2947770114MaRDI QIDQ5111109

Arunava Sen, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_13

zbMATH Keywords

random social choice functionsclassical committee formation modelrandom voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• Dictatorial domains
• On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
• Random dictatorship domains
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability

This page was built for publication: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules