Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_15zbMath1443.91092OpenAlexW2947262942MaRDI QIDQ5111111

Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_15

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designfree marketscentralized planningrepeated implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items

Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem

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