Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder

DOI10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.77zbMath1441.68080arXiv1510.04991OpenAlexW2963620975MaRDI QIDQ5111408

Aviad Rubinstein

Publication date: 27 May 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.04991

zbMATH Keywords

signalingzero-sum gamesalgorithmic game theorybirthday repetition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

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