IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION IN A THIRD-PRICE AUCTION MODEL
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Publication:5112013
DOI10.1017/S0266466618000440zbMath1440.62119OpenAlexW3086506656MaRDI QIDQ5112013
Andreea Enache, Jean-Pierre Florens
Publication date: 27 May 2020
Published in: Econometric Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266466618000440
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Nonparametric regression and quantile regression (62G08) Density estimation (62G07) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models ⋮ Quantile analysis of ``hazard-rate game models
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