Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
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Publication:5113183
DOI10.1093/restud/rdy013zbMath1439.91021OpenAlexW1556910047MaRDI QIDQ5113183
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Publication date: 3 June 2020
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20011.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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