Informative Cheap Talk in Elections

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDY009zbMath1439.91014OpenAlexW2793447307MaRDI QIDQ5113195

Richard Van Weelden, Navin Kartik

Publication date: 3 June 2020

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1b31c98941e596207246c3fe4f2392ed663a9282

zbMATH Keywords

career concernspanderingcampaignsreputational distortionsvoter learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Goodwill in communication ⋮ Monotone comparative statics in the Calvert-Wittman model ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency

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