The provision of wage incentives: A structural estimation using contracts variation

DOI10.3982/QE597zbMath1453.91059OpenAlexW1567238308MaRDI QIDQ5116139

Xavier D'Haultfœuille, Philippe Février

Publication date: 24 August 2020

Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/qe597

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationincentivesnonparametric identificationoptimal contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (2)

A structural analysis of simple contracts ⋮ Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts

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