Self serving reference points in double auctions

DOI10.1111/BOER.12214zbMATH Open1440.91022OpenAlexW2966934714MaRDI QIDQ5117644

Husnain Fateh Ahmad

Publication date: 26 August 2020

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12214

zbMATH Keywords

reference dependencedouble auctionsconsistent reference pointself serving bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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