Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests

DOI10.1287/DECA.2017.0356OpenAlexW3123680570MaRDI QIDQ5118188

Didier Dègnidé Hounwanou

Publication date: 7 September 2020

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2017.0356

zbMATH Keywords

auctiontoeholdstakeover

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (2)

Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency ⋮ Private value takeover auctions with toeholds: an experimental study

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Effective contests
• Toeholds and signalling in takeover auctions
• Jump bidding in takeover auctions
• Jump bidding in ascending auctions: the case of takeover contests
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation

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