An Infinite-Horizon Mean Field Game of Growth and Capital Accumulation: A Markov Chain Approximation Numerical Scheme and Its Challenges

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_8zbMath1448.91024OpenAlexW3035600633MaRDI QIDQ5118432

Chee Kian Leong

Publication date: 8 September 2020

Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39789-0_8

zbMATH Keywords

mean field games\(\epsilon\)-Nash equilibriumMarkov-chain approximation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16)

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