Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle

DOI10.1287/deca.2018.0380OpenAlexW2942738779MaRDI QIDQ5118434

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 8 September 2020

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2018.0380

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintygame theoryriskagentsstrategic interactionformalizationprecautionary principleprincipals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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• Common Agency
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• Measuring Effort
• The Ordinality of Effort Revisited
• TAKING EFFORT SERIOUSLY: A REPLY TO CURRIE AND STEEDMAN
• Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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