Price of Anarchy in Networks with Heterogeneous Latency Functions

DOI10.1287/moor.2019.1012zbMath1455.91057OpenAlexW2988660622MaRDI QIDQ5119855

Jung-Hwan Shin, Sanjiv Kapoor

Publication date: 1 September 2020

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1012

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchynetwork games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (1)

Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand

Cites Work

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• Pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
• A multiclass, multicriteria traffic network equilibrium model
• Potential games
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• A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
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• How bad is selfish routing?
• Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing
• Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks
• Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
• Priority Assignment in Waiting Line Problems
• Traffic assignment problem for a general network
• The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

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