Incentive-Compatible Surveys via Posterior Probabilities

DOI10.1137/S0040585X97T989957zbMath1452.91070OpenAlexW3046956418MaRDI QIDQ5120713

Hrvoje Šikić, Jakša Cvitanić, Drazen Prelec, Sonja Radas

Publication date: 16 September 2020

Published in: Theory of Probability & Its Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/s0040585x97t989957

zbMATH Keywords

proper scoring rulesBayesian truth serummechanism implementationranking expertsrobust/universal mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

The wisdom of the crowd and prediction markets

Cites Work

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• Bayesian markets to elicit private information
• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
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• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations

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