School choice under partial fairness
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Publication:5121481
DOI10.3982/TE2482zbMath1442.91064OpenAlexW2947655231WikidataQ126632827 ScholiaQ126632827MaRDI QIDQ5121481
A. Arda Gitmez, Umut Mert Dur, Özgür Yılmaz
Publication date: 14 September 2020
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2482
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