Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
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Publication:5121482
DOI10.3982/TE3565zbMath1448.91040OpenAlexW2972813727MaRDI QIDQ5121482
Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Luis R. Izquierdo, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 14 September 2020
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3565
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Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: simple formulas and applications ⋮ Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior ⋮ Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling ⋮ Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ Stable sampling in repeated games ⋮ Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
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